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Is "The Surge" Working? Some New Facts*
ABSTRACT
There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent mihtary "Surge" on conditions in Iraq and
whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound.
Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important,
but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This
paper applies modem statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most
reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge's impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of
the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets' assessment of
Iraq's future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current
evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.
The analysis reveals mixed evidence on the Surge's effect on key trends in Iraq. The security situation
has improved insofar as civilian fatalities have declined without any concurrent increase in casualties
among coalition and Iraqi troops. However, other areas, such as oil production and the number of trained
Iraqi Security Forces have shown no improvement or declined. Evaluating such conflicting indicators is
challenging.
There is, however, another way to assess the Surge. This paper shows how data from world financial
markets can be used to shed light on the central question of whether the Surge has increased or
diminished the prospect of today's Iraq surviving into the fiature. In particular, I examine the price of
Iraqi state bonds, which the Iraqi govermnent is currently servicing, on world financial markets. After the
Surge, there was a sharp decline in the price of those bonds, relative to ahemative bonds. This decline
signals a 40% increase in the market's expectation that Iraq will default. This finding suggests that, to
date, the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it.
Michael Greenstone
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Economics






"We need a surge of facts."
Tony Snow, Press Secretary for President George W. Bush, July 12, 2007
Is the war in Iraq worth its cost? The rationales for the war include that it plays a central role in
protecting the nation against threats from al-Qaeda, ensuring a reliable supply of oil to the world market,
preventing a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, providing an environment that allows for a stable Middle East,
and ensuring the future of a sovereign Iraqi state. As of September V 2007, approximately 27,662 US
soldiers have been wounded and 3,735 have been killed in the course of the war's prosecution. The US
has spent about $403 biUion (Sunshine 2007) to date on the war and related activities, and it has been
estimated that its ultimate costs could exceed $2 triUion (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). The current debate
about the war in Iraq is centered on whether the Surge is working.
There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military "Surge" on conditions in Iraq
and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound.
Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important,
but, until now, few if any systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This
paper applies modem statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most
reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge's impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of
the Iraqi state (including civilian casuahies); military casuahies; and financial markets' assessment of
Iraq's fliture. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current
evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about fiiture strategy.
The central challenge for this analysis is to determine what would have happened in Iraq in the
absence of the Surge. In the ideal, there would be two completely identical Iraqs— one in which the
Surge took place and another in which it did not. These two Iraqs could be compared to determine the
Surge's causal impacts. As a feasible alternative, this paper compares outcomes in the period before the
Surge to the same outcomes in the period after the Surge's initiation. In some cases the outcome
variables were trending upwards or downwards in advance of the Surge. In order to avoid confounding
these pre-existing trends with the effect of the Surge, this paper tests for changes in these trends.

The analysis shows mixed evidence on the Surge's effect on the current functioning of the Iraqi
state. Perhaps the crudest expression of the security situation in Iraq is the rate of civilian fatalities. I find
a substantial reduction in civilian fatalities in Baghdad and the rest of Iraq. Further, there isn't a decline
and there may be an increase in the number of hours of electricity available to Iraqi consumers (although
not in Baghdad). On the less positive side, the size of the Iraqi Security Force w^as about 10% lower 25
weeks after the Surge began than would have been predicted by trends prior to the Surge. Additionally,
the analysis finds that after the Surge oil production didn't increase and may have decreased. Oil is Iraq's
primary source of income.
The second category of outcomes examines the impact of the Surge on casualties suffered both by
coalition soldiers and Iraqi Security Forces. The analysis indicates that the Surge had little impact on the
number of casualties suffered by coalition and Iraqi Security Force troops. There is even some evidence
of a decline in the number of non-fatal casualties per day among US soldiers. Since the number of US
troops in Iraq was increasing in this period, these findings are noteworthy.
The stated purpose of the Surge was to create the conditions necessary for a stable Iraq to emerge.
These first two categories provide mixed evidence on the Surge's effect on the current functioning of the
Iraqi state. Making sound decisions about how to proceed in Iraq based on such conflicting indicators is
extraordinarily challenging. For example, does the positive news on security outweigh the negative
findings about Iraqi Security Forces (or the failures on many of the 18 congressionally mandated
benchmarks)? In the face of this uncertainty, analyst judgment and politics may play too large a role.
There is, however, another way to assess the Surge. This paper shows how data from world
financial markets can be used to shed light on the central question of whether the Surge has increased or
diminished the prospect of a functioning Iraq. In particular, I examine the price of Iraqi state bonds that
the Iraqi government is currently servicing on world financial markets. ' Importantly, these bonds trade
on world financial markets; for example, hedge funds hold a substantial fraction of them and their price
' In a novel paper. Chancy (2007) uses variation in prices of these Iraqi bonds during the January 2006 through
August 2006 period to assess the most effective pacification policies in Iraq. This paper has several important
findings but perhaps the most important ones are that sectarian violence is associated with declines in the prices of
these bonds, while signs of political progress in Iraq are associated with increases in bond prices.

on the secondary market is quoted in Bloomberg's financial data services. The appeal of using financial
markets is that traders' only concern is to make profitable decisions and this necessarily requires making
correct projections. There isn't room for personal biases in this setting. Consequently, it isn't surprising
that these markets have a good track record at predicting uncertain future events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz
2004).
Overall, the bond market findings fail to support the view that the Surge is helping to pave the
way for the emergence of a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it. After the Surge, the Iraqi
bonds' yield increased by 115 to 170 basis points, relative to comparison bonds. This translates into an
approximate 40% increase in the expected aimual probability of default. In other words, the world
financial markets are saying that Iraq's prospects declined after the Surge.
Examining bond yields to learn about the effectiveness of the Surge requires several assumptions,
including that financial markets efficiently and accurately aggregate public and private information from
diverse sources. Further, the meaning of this exercise would be undermined if the documented
movements in bond yields reflect domestic US politics. I find that the increases in default risk remain
even after controlling for the probability that a Democrat will be elected President in 2008. This finding
does not eliminate the domestic politics explanation, but it substantially weakens the case for it.
There are several caveats to this analysis that bear highlighting. First, due to the absence of data
that predates the invasion of Iraq, the analysis can only inform the question of the Surge's efficacy. This
paper is not directly informative about the broader question of the impact of the Iraq war. Second, the
data on the current functioning of Iraq fail to cover many outcomes that would be both of great interest
and potentially more informative than the available ones. Third, even among the available data, there are
legitimate questions about quality and reliability. This is especially the case with the civilian casualty
data.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief background on the
Surge. Section III briefly describes the data file compiled for the analysis (there is a much more extensive
discussion in the Data Appendix) and IV outlines the statistical models. Section V discusses the results.
Section VI concludes.

II. Background on the Surge
This section has tiiree goals. First, it provides a brief review of the factors that led to the
initiation of the military strategy that is known as the Surge. Second, it motivates the choice of February
14, 2007 as the starting date of the Surge. Third, it provides some details regarding the Surge's
implementation on the ground in Iraq.
On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced that the number of troops deployed in Iraq
would be increased by roughly 30,000. The stated short run goal of this troop increase was to provide the
manpower necessary so that the US military could reduce the sectarian violence that was centered in
Baghdad.' The theory being that by improving security, the Surge could achieve its ultimate goal of
providing the Iraqi government the opportunity to grow and govern more effectively, ultimately leading
to a stable Iraq. (See Figure 1 for a map of Iraq and Baghdad's central physical location and large
population share.) The President enunciated this goal and its motivation when he said, "The most urgent
priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq's sectarian violence
occurs within 30 miles of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves and
shaking the confidence of all Iraqis" (Bush 2007). This focus represented a shift in policy that was
cemented by the shift in leadership that followed as General David Petraeus replaced General George
Casey as commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq on February 10, 2007.
The sectarian conflict that the Surge aims to control has an extensive history in Iraq. The
violence of Saddam Hussein's Sunni dominated government against Shiites and Kurdish Iraqis is just one
manifestation. In late 2003, following the US invasion in that year, a Sunni insurgency was growing that
would focus on attacking Shi'a to leverage political control (al-Khalidi & Tarmer 2006).
"
"In Iraq today, the term 'sectarian violence' is a euphemism for Shi'a-Surmi violence. The Kurds are not part of the
current explosion in sectarian strife. And while past and fiiture problems involving sectarian violence in Kurdish
areas - as well as sectarian violence against Kurds in South and Central Iraq - are not to be discounted, the main
source of sectarian displacement are attacks on Surinis and Shi'a by Shi'a and Sunni radical groups respectively" (al-
Khalidi & Tanner, 2006).

Over the next few years, there were several key events that underscored the increasing sectarian
violence. On March 2, 2004, during the Shiite festival of Ashoura, two bombings near shrines in Karbala,
a city holy to Shi'a Muslims, killed 85 and wounded 100. Almost simultaneously, suicide bombers at the
Kazimiya shrine in Baghdad killed at least 58 people and wounded 200 (Pacific Disaster Management
Information Network, 2004). By mid-2005, Sunni and Shi'a victims of execution-style killings were
regularly being discovered throughout Iraq (al-Khalidi & Tanner, 2006). In September of the same year, a
car bomb in Kadhimiya, a predominantly Shi'a district of Baghdad, killed more than 100 people; while, in
October, an attack at a Shi'a mosque in Hilla on the first day of Ramadan killed 87 people ("Scores killed
in Baghdad Attacks," 2005; al-Khalidi & Tanner, 2006). In November, American soldiers found 173
mostly Sunni prisoners held in the basement of an Interior Ministry building where they had "apparently
been abused by the largely Shi'a police force" (al-Khalidi & Tanner, 2006).
The bombing of the Al-Askariya "Golden Mosque" in Samarra on February 22, 2006 raised
concerns about the sectarian violence to new levels. The Golden Mosque is one of the holiest sites in
Shi'a Islam. The bombing is viewed by some observers as a tipping point that initiated a new equilibrium
with higher levels of sectarian violence.
The bombing and its aftermath also helped to crystallize the view that the US military's strategy
at that time was not succeeding. Until then, the US's strategy in Baghdad largely consisted of conducting
raids aimed at clearing insurgents fi^om difficult areas and neighborhoods and then turning those areas
over to the Iraqi security forces. Over time, it became clear that the Iraqi security forces were not able to
effectively protect these neighborhoods after the US raids. Further, the ISF's efforts to build local
services that would improve the quality of life within the neighborhoods were also failing.
It is in this context that President Bush increased the number of troops in Iraq. Figure 2 reports
the time series of the number of US and Coalition Troops in Iraq since May 2003. The figure documents
that the number of US troops in January 2007 was 132,000 and has increased every month since then so
that it was 162,000 in August 2007.^ The figure also makes clear that the US accounts for the vast
^ The vertical line in Figure 2 is drawn to intersect the January 2007 data points. All points to the right of the
vertical line occur after the initiation of the Surge.

majority of the coalition: the US share ranges from a low of 82% in December 2003 to a high of 93% in
August 2007.
These additional troops allowed the military to initiate a new strategy that was focused on
achieving security in Baghdad. This strategy has two major components—Operation Enforcing the Law"*
and Operation Phantom Thunder. Together, these operations aim to stabilize areas by first removing
insurgent groups and stopping violence, then maintaining this initial stability over a period of time before
giving the Iraqi Security Forces complete responsibility for them.
Operation Enforcing the Law became operational on February 14, 2007. The commander of
Multi-National Division- Baghdad, Major General Joseph Fil, described this operation:
77^/5 new plan involves three basic parts: clear, control and retain. The first objective
within each of the security districts in the Iraqi capital is to clear out extremist elements
neighborhood by neighborhood in an effort to protect the population. And after an area
is cleared, we 're moving to what we call the control operation. Together with our Iraqi
counterparts, we 'II maintain a full-time presence on the sti-eets, and we '11 do this by
building and maintaining joint security stations throughout the city. [ ... J. An area
moves into the retain phase when the Iraqi security forces are fully responsible for the
day-today security mission. At this point, coalition forces begin to move out of the
neighborhood and into locations where they can respond to requests for assistance as
needed. During these three phrases, efforts will be ongoing to stimulate local economies
by creating employment opportunities, initiating reconstruction projects and improving
the infrastructure. (Press Conference with Maj. Gen. Joseph FilJr., 2007)
This plan requires not just the raids calculated to break down insurgent groups and the resources that were
characteristic of military operations pre-2007, but also a force that remains in the cleared area until it is
secure and the Iraqi Security forces are sufficiently large and well-trained to control the area on their own.
The second piece of the Surge strategy. Operation Phantom Thunder, became operational on June
15, 2007. This operation's goal is to stem the flow of weapons and insurgents in and out of Baghdad
(Kagan, July 2007). According to General Odiemo, Operation Phantom Thunder and the smaller
operations that fall under it "are intended to eliminate accelerants to Baghdad violence from enemy
support zones in the belts that ring the city" with the goal of enabling the Iraqi government to function
and move towards stabilizing the country politically (Press Conference with Lt. Gen. Ray Odiemo,
"* Operation Enforcing the Law is the official name for Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon which is also known as the
Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) and has been referred to as Operation Law and Order ("Baghdad Security Plan
Officially Named," 2007).

2007). Regions within these belts^ are targeted because of their established insurgent strongholds,
placement along major roads and lines of communication, proximity to Baghdad, and other factors that
make them vulnerable to destabilizing forces that might move into or out of the capital city.
In summary, this paper defines the Surge as the addition of the 30,000 extra troops and the
implementation of Operations Enforcing the Law and Phantom Thunder. As this section has documented,
the Surge constitutes a major shift in US military policy in Iraq that aims to reduce the sectarian violence
centered in Baghdad with the hope that this will allow the Iraqi government to grow, govern more
effectively, and ultimately become a functioning independent country. The remainder of this paper
assesses whether the Surge's initiation on February 14, 2007 affected the functioning of the Iraqi state,
coalition casualties, and the world financial market's prediction about the prospects for a stable Iraq.
>
III. Data and Summary Statistics
The data file used to conduct the analysis comes firom more than a dozen data sources. I learned
about many of them from the Brooking Institution's Iraq Index, which has played an instrumental role in
providing valuable information about the war in Iraq for several years. Other data series were found in
the Department of State's Iraq Weekly Status Report (IWSR). I discovered some other data sources on
my own. In general, I collected the data series used in this analysis from their original sources by
following up on the citations found in the Iraq Index and the Weekly Status Report. All of the original
sources are detailed in the extensive Data Appendix at the end of this paper.
The data are grouped into three categories that form the basis of the subsequent analysis
categories. The first involves functioning of the Iraqi state. The variables in this category include the
number of civilian fatalities, the size of Iraqi Security Forces, crude oil production, and hours of
electricity available to Iraqis. The second category is military casuahies. These variables include
coalition fatalities, non-fatal US casualties, and Iraqi Security Forces fatalities. The third category is the
' The outer ring [of the belt around Baghdad] runs from Taji (north of Baghdad between the 11 or 12 o'clock
position), clockwise to Tarmiyah (one), Buhriz (two), Besmaya (three), Salman Pak (five), Mahmudiyah (six), Sadr
al Yusifiyah (eight), Fallujah (nine) and Karmah (ten)" (Kagan, July 2007).

world financial markets' assessment of the future of the Iraqi state. The key variables for this category
are the prices and yields of the Iraqi government bond issued in January 2006 that pays coupons twice a
year and matures in 2028.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on a number of outcome variables. Panel A reports the
values of several dependent variables at key dates. Panel B presents means of some important variables
over three time periods. In the "All" column, the sample begins with the earliest observation and
continues through the last available one. In the "1.5 Years Prior" and "1 Year Prior" columns, the
samples begin 1 .5 and 1 year before the initiation of the Surge and continue through the last available
observation.
Finally, the collection of this data file has taken hundreds of person-hours. I am in the process of
writing documentation for these files and will post them on my web site as soon as possible to facilitate
future research on the Iraq war.
IV. Methodology
The central challenge for this analysis is to determine the causal impact of the Surge on the
functioning of the Iraqi state. The hypothetical ideal for this study would be a parallel universe with
another Iraq in which the US did not initiate a Surge. This parallel would provide a counterfactual for
what would have happened in Iraq without the Surge. It would then be straightforward to compare the
variables of interest in the current Iraq and in the parallel Iraq to assess the causal impacts of the Surge.
In the absence of this impractical ideal, this paper compares outcome variables before and after
the Surge began. The basic idea is simple: the best available counterfactual for what happened after the
Surge in Iraq is what was happening in Iraq before the initiation of the Surge. In some cases the outcome
variables were trending upwards or downwards in advance of the Surge. To avoid confounding these pre-
existing trends with the Surge, the paper tests for changes in these trends. The key idea is that it is
* The appeal of classical experiments is that they reveal the causal impact of an intervention (e.g., a new drug)
without a parallel universe. By randomly assigning the treatment, classical experiments guarantee that the treatment
and control groups are identical so that ex-post comparisons reveal casual impacts.

possible to estimate the Surge's causal impacts only if tiie untestable assumption— that Iraq prior to the
Surge is indeed a vaUd counterfactual for post-Surge Iraq— holds after controlling for pre-existing trends.
This paper implements two statistical tests for all of the variables examined. The first is referred
to as the "mean shift model." This approach simply tests for whether the variable's mean changed after
the Surge. For example, in an examination of the number of Iraqi civilian fatalities per day, this approach
tests whether the mean number of fatalities per day before and after the Surge is equal. Its assumption is
that all determinants of fatalities per day, besides the Surge, are constant before and after the Surge.
Specifically, the mean shift model involves fitting the following equation:
(1) y, = ao + P l(Surge), + £„
where y is the outcome variable and t indicates a day or week. The variable of interest is 1 (Surge) which
is an indicator variable equal to 1 for days on or after February 14, 2007. The parameter p measures the
change in the outcome relative to the period before the Surge. Thus in the case of the daily Iraqi civilian
fatality rate, a positive estimate of P would indicate that this rate was higher in the period after the Surge.
The subsequent analysis reports on estimates of P and a heteroskedastic consistent standard error.'
A shortcoming of the mean shift model is that in the presence of pre-existing trends, the estimated
P will reflect the trend and any independent impact of the Surge. A trend break model allows for a pre-
existing trend in the variable and then tests whether this trend changes. Consequently, it is a more robust
method than the mean shift model.
Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
(2) y, = a + 5 (r- February 14, 2007) + P((/- February 14, 2007)* l(5wrge),) + £„
where y and t are as before. The variable (t - February 14, 2007) is a time trend (i.e., it equals on
February 14, 2007).** The variable {{t - February 14, 2007) * \(Surge) ,) is the interaction of the time
trend and an indicator variable equal to 1 for days on or after February 14, 2007. The parameter of
interest is p and it measures the average slope change in the outcome that occurred after the Surge began.
'
I also experiment with Newey-West standard errors that allow for unspecified heteroskedasticy and autocorrelation
with 3 lags. These standard errors were very similar to the purely heteroskedastic-consistent ones.
^ For example, it equals -1 on February 13, 2007 and -2 on February 12, 2007. Going forward, it equals on
Febmary 14, 2007, 1 on Febmary 15, 2007, 2 on Febmary 16, 2007, etc.

The key assumption needed for this method to identify the causal effect of the Surge is that after
controlHng for the pre-existing trend in the outcome variable, the Surge is the only change in the
determinants of the outcome. As a robustness check, I will also report on models that add month fixed
effects to allow for seasonality in the outcomes.
The parameter 8 provides an opportunity to test the validity of the mean shift model specified in
equation (1). Specifically, a rejection of the null hypothesis of a zero pre-period trend would lead to a
rejection of the mean shift model. The subsequent analysis uses this test to identify cases where the data
fail to support the validity of the mean shift model. In these cases, the trend break model's results are the
preferred ones.
Another reason that this model is appealing in the context of the Surge is that it took several
months for the Surge to become fully operational and it allows the impact of the Surge to increase over
time.' In the subsequent analysis, I report p times the largest value of (t - February 14, 2007) in the
available data file, which is typically at least 5 months after February 14, 2007.
Finally, one other issue merits attention. Wars are not conducted in stable environments, and the
Iraq war is no exception. There appears to be a trade-off between bias and precision. On the one hand, as
the set of days prior to the Surge used as a counterfactual grows larger, the resulting estimates become
more precise. On the other hand, however, conditions have changed quickly throughout the war, and it
may be inappropriate to treat observations from long before the Surge as useful in forming a valid
counterfactual for what happened during the Surge.
I experimented with several start dates for the analysis and will present two throughout the paper.
The first is 1 year before the Surge's initiation and the second is 1.5 years before. The former predates
the bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra on February 22, 2006 by a week. This bombing helped to
crystallize the sectarian violence instigated by the insurgents through fomenting a cycle of reprisals; it is
associated with a marked increase in violence in Iraq. It seems plausible to assume that this period forms
the correct counter-factual for the period after the Surge. The longer pre-period allows for a more precise
' Specifically, the new troops began arriving in February 2007, but the full complement of about 30,000 troops
weren't stationed in Iraq until several months later (perhaps June).
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estimation of the outcomes in a pre-period where the overall level of violence was lower. Since the
bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra changed the political and security dynamics substantially, the
results from the shorter 1 year pre-period are emphasized, but results based on both pre-periods are
presented for completeness.
V. Results
This section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection examines whether the Surge
has affected the current functioning of the Iraqi state. The second examines the human cost on the
coalition and Iraqi security forces that are prosecuting the war. The final subsection examines the impact
of the Surge on the yields and the implied default probabilities of Iraqi bonds.
A. Functioning of the Iraqi State
Civilian Fatalities. Table 2 reports the impact of the Surge on the daily number of fatalities of
Iraqi civilians using the Iraq Body Count data set. The subsequent tables will be structured similarly, so
the entries and their meaning are described in detail here.
Panel A reports the estimated shift in the mean number of fatalities per day (P) from the mean
shift model in equation (2). Its standard error is reported below it in parentheses. A * next to the entry
indicates that the null hypothesis that the estimate is equal to zero can be rejected at the 5% level, while
** means that the null can be rejected at the 1% level. For the entries that don't have either a * or a **, it
isn't possible to reject the null hypothesis at conventional significance levels.
Panel B reports results from fitting the trend break model specified in equation (2). The latest day
with available civilian casualty data is July 17, 2007 and this corresponds to the 153"* day after the Surge
began. So, the first two rows present 153 multiplied by the estimate of p with the corresponding standard
error in parentheses. Consequently, the entry reports the estimated change in the number of civilian
fatalities per day by July 17, 2007 due to the change in trend break after the Surge's initiation. A negative
entry means that the Surge is associated with a reduction in fatalities.
11

The entry in the "Pre-trend" row reports the estimate of the coefficient 5 with its estimated
standard error below in parentheses. This provides an opportunity to assess whether there was a trend in
daily fatalities in the period leading up to the initiation of the Surge. A positive parameter estimate
indicates that fatalities per day were increasing before the Surge. As noted above, a rejection of the null
hypothesis of a zero pre-trend means that results from the trend break model are more reliable.
The table has three sets of columns. Column (la) reports results when the sample is all civilian
fatalities in Iraq per day and the sample begins 1.5 years, or 548 days, before the Surge's initiation. The
only difference in column (lb) is that the sample begins 1 year, or 365 days, prior to the Surge. Columns
(2a) and (2b) conduct the analogous analysis with data on fatalities per day from Baghdad only. This may
be of especial interest since the Surge's activities were concentrated in Baghdad. Finally, columns (3a)
and (3b) report on the remainder of Iraq. -
Now turning to the results for all of Iraq, it is evident that there was a strong upward pre-trend.
This undermines the validity of the mean shift model, leading me to concentrate on the trend break
results. These results indicate that there were approximately 56-61 fewer fatalities per day 153 days after
the Surge than there would have been if the pre-trend had continued.'" These estimates would easily be
judged to be statistically different from zero by conventional criteria. This is a very high fraction of the
overall mean of the dependent variable, but daily fatality counts were quite high in the last few weeks
before the Surge. For example, the mean of the dependent variable in the last month before the Surge was
92.9 civilian deaths per day. Notably in the case of this dependent variable, the choice of start date for the
sample doesn't affect the results in a meaningful way.
The second and third sets of columns reveal that roughly 60% of this decline occurs in Baghdad.
It is noteworthy that the decline outside of Baghdad is also statistically significant. This result contradicts
the "squirt" theory that the Surge would push violence to other parts of Iraq.
'° The inclusion of month fixed effects in the trend break specification in columns (la) and (lb) has no substantive
impact on the predicted decline in civilian fatalities. In particular, the coefficients (standard errors) are -76.5 (28.0)




Figure 3 provides an opportunity to better understand the whole country resuhs from the sample
that begins 1 year before the Surge. The squares represent the average daily number of fatalities over
independent 7-day periods (e.g., the left most square is the average over days t =-365 through t = -359).
The figure also presents the fitted values from the estimation of the trend break model. There is a vertical
line at t= 0, which is the date that the Surge began.
This figure explains the source of the results in Table 2. Specifically, the upward trend in
fatalities in the pre-period is evident. Most notably, there is a sharp downward break in trend after the
initiation of the Surge. The figure provides compelling evidence of a decline in civilian fatalities after the
Surge's initiation. ,
,
Overall, the civilian fatality results demonstrate that the Surge is associated with an important
decline in civilian fatalities. " ft is certainly possible that some of these results are due to the reported
increases in migration out of Baghdad and Iraq more generally, but the sharpness of the results makes it
unlikely that that this is the entire story. In many respects, this result confirms the popular theory of
domestic policing that putting more cops on the beat reduces the crime rate.
Finally, the source for these data (i.e., IraqBodycount.org) uses only the most reliable reports on
civilian casualties, so their numbers likely understate the true number of civiUan casualties, perhaps
substantially so. Consequently, this section's estimates likley understate the impact of the Surge on total
fatalities. A recent cross sectional survey conducted in Iraq suggests that the Iraq Body Count numbers
may substantially understate total civilian casualties substantially.'" Importantly, the trends in civilian
casualties revealed from the survey match up well with the trends from Iraq Body Count. So afthough
this analysis is unlikely to reveal the impact of the Surge on the exact number of fatalities, this
" The website www.icasualties.org also publishes a data file on civilian fatalities. An examination of the
methodologies suggests that the Iraq Body Count data file is likely to be more reliable. One advantage of the
icasulties data file is that more recent data is available: it includes data through 191 days after February 14, 2007. I
collected the icasualties data set for all of Iraq, and it produces results that are qualitatively very similar to those in
Table 2. Specifically, the post-trend evaluated at t =191 and its standard error is -52.6 (23.7) and -67.8 (27,1) from
the All of Iraq column (la) and (lb) specifications, respectively.
'^ A nationwide household survey of 1,849 households conducted between May and July 2006 suggests that about
655,000 more Iraqis died than would have been predicted by pre-War trends between March 2003 and the time of
the survey (Bumham, Lafta, Doocy, and Roberts 2006). This estimate is roughly 10 times larger than the estimate
from Iraq Body Count. Importantly, the percentage increase in fatalities between a similar survey conducted in 2004
and the 2006 survey closely follow the trends in the Iraq Body County data.
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measurement error should not undermine the paper's ability to detect the impact of the Surge on trends in
civilian fatalities.
Size ofIraqi Security Forces. Another important indicator of the functioning of the Iraqi state is
the nimiber of members of the Iraqi Security Force (ISF). For this paper's purposes, the ISF is defined as
the number of the personnel of the police, national police, other security forces working for the Ministry,
Army, Air Force, and Navy. This variable is measured weekly, although it is missing for several weeks.
Table 3 reports the regression results. Since there is clear evidence of a pre-existing upward
trend, I focus on the trend break model results. Specifically, this model indicates that ISF personnel were
increased by about 2,000 per week prior to the Surge. The results show that there was a downward trend
break after the Surge such that there were 25,000 - 28,000 fewer ISF troops 25 weeks later than there
would have been had the pre-trend continued. '^ These estimates suggest that 25 weeks after the Surge the
number of ISF personnel was about 10% less than would have been predicted by pre-existing trends.
Figure 4 displays this result graphically.
'''
Crude Oil Production. Table 4 and Figure 5 present the results for millions of barrels of crude oil
production per day, which is measured weekly. The mean production is about 2.1 million barrels per day
in this period. There is little evidence that the Surge affected oil production from the specifications
reported in the table. However, versions of these same specifications that include month fixed effect
indicate declines in oil production of roughly 20%, relative to pre-existing trends. Specifically, the point
estimates (standard errors) from versions of the columns (1) and (2) trend break specifications that
include month fixed effects are -0.4454 (0.0708) and -0.3707 (0.0697).
Hours of Electricity per Day. Most electricity generation takes place outside of Baghdad; and, since the
war began, electricity producing regions have been reluctant to fully share electricity with the capital city. This is
borne out in the means of the dependent variables. The average of hours of electricity per day in Baghdad is around
'^ The point estimates (standard errors) from versions of the columns (1) and (2) trend break specifications that add
month fixed effects are -30,997 (4,619) and -14,648 (6,397), respectively.
'" Figure 4 is an excellent example of how the mean shift model can confound pre-existing trends with the true
impact of the Surge. A simple comparison of pre and post mean ISF personnel levels would lead to the conclusion
that the Surge increased troop levels (in fact, this is the conclusion from the mean shift model). The figure helps to
underscore that this conclusion is unlikely to be valid because of the sharp upward pre-period trend.
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6 to 6.5 relative to about 1 1 in the country as a whole (separate data for the non-Baghdad region alone is
unavailable). Before describing the electricity results, I note that the reliability of these data have been called into
question on several occasions and that they are missing for 1 1 of the 25 weeks in the period after the Surge began
(Levey and Zavis 2007).
Table 5 and Figure 6 repoil the association between the Surge and average hours of electricity
available per day in Baghdad and the entire country. Both dependent variables are trending downwards in
the pre-Surge period. The results from the preferred trend break model show little evidence of a
meaningful change in hours of electricity per day in Baghdad. However, the results for all of Iraq indicate
that the Surge was associated with a 20%-25% increase in hours of electricity for Iraqis living outside
Baghdad. The meaning of these results is tempered by the fact that the electricity data is unavailable for
11 of the 25 post-Surge weeks (i.e., May 8, 2007 through July 31, 2007). Further, the results for all of
Iraq are weaker for versions of columns (2a) and (2b) that include month fixed effects. Specifically, the
point estimates, with standard errors in parentheses, are 1.74 (0.73) and 0.56 (1.00) respectively.
B. Military Casualties
Coalition Fatalities. Table 6 reports on the impact of the Surge on coalition fatalities through
186 days after the Surge's initiation. For all of Iraq, there was an average of 2.66 coalition fatalities per
day in the longer sample and 2.77 in the shorter sample. The mean numbers for daily fatalities inside and
outside of Baghdad were roughly 0.85 and 1.85, respectively. It is evident that fatalities were increasing
in the period preceding the Surge, so the trend break model is more appropriate.
The trend break results find little meaningful evidence of a change in daily fatalities after the
Surge. This is partially because the estimates are imprecise, which makes it difficult to detect change.
However, the estimates are also sensitive to sample choice. For example, the point estimate is essentially
zero in the sample that begins 1.5 years before the Surge, while it is -0.9 in the sample that begins 1 year
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before.'^ Notably, the overall result is due to a statistically significant decline in coalition fatalities
outside of Baghdad. Many of these findings, especially the noisiness of the data, are evident in Figure 7.
Overall, it appears that the Surge had little impact on the number of coalition fatalities per day in
Iraq. However, since the number of troops in this period increased substantially, the daily fatality rate
(e.g., fataUties per 100,000 soldiers) declined.
US Non-Fatal Casualties. Table 7 reports on the number of wounded soldiers per day in Iraq.
There are separate results for all non-fatal casualties, casualties that prevent soldiers from returning to
action within 3 days, and casuahies that allow soldiers to return within 3 days. Over the samples, there
are 18-19 non-fatal casualties per day, with slightly less than half resulting in soldiers' inability to return
to action within 3 days. For all three dependent variables, there is evidence that the incidence of these
casualties was increasing in advance of the Surge.
The trend break results suggest that there is a modest decline in the number of non-fatal casualties
per day among US troops. In the shorter and preferred sample, the point estimate implies an almost 20%
reduction that occurs, just about entirely, among the less serious casuahies. This is shown graphically in
the accompanying Figure 8. The longer sample indicates a smaller decline and one that is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. '^ As with the fatality data, these findings would be stronger if the outcome
variable were normalized by the number of troops in Iraq.
Iraqi Security Force Fatalities. Table 8 and Figure 9 present results on the estimated impact of
the Surge on the number of Iraqi Security Force Fatalities per day. There is little evidence of pre-Surge
trends in this variable, so neither model can be rejected in advance. Both models and samples fail to find
evidence of a meaningful change in the number of fatalities per day. The inclusion of month fixed effects
does not alter this conclusion.
C. World Financial Markets' Assessment of Iraq's Future
'' The point estimates (standard errors) from the trend break versions of columns (la) and (lb) are 0.564 (0.543) and
-0.405 (0.744), respectively.
'* The inclusion of month fixed effects causes the point estimate (standard error) to increase to -3.06 (1.31) in
column (la). In (lb), the estimate becomes -2.76 (1.31). Thus, this richer model finds a decline in the rate at which
soldiers are wounded in both samples.
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The ultimate purpose of the Surge is to create the conditions that will allow for a stable Iraq to
emerge. Thus far, the paper has documented that the Surge has been effective at improving the security
situation in Iraq without an appreciable increase in casualties among coalition and Iraqi troops. However,
some other indicators of the current functioning of the Iraqi state (e.g., oil production and the number of
Iraqi Security Forces) have failed to show improvements. Thus, to this point, this exercise has produced
mixed evidence on the impact of the Surge on the current functioning of the Iraqi state. Further, there is
no readily available model that synthesizes these conflicting results to determine whether the Surge is
achieving its ultimate goal of improving the prospects for an autonomous Iraq.
This subsection shows that data from world financial markets can be used to transparently shed
light on the central question of whether the Surge has altered the prospects that a functioning Iraq will
exist in the fiiture. In particular, I examine the prices of Iraqi state bonds that are currently being serviced
by the Iraqi government and of credit default swaps for those bonds. " The goal is to infer how the Surge
changed the world financial market's predictions about the probability that Iraq would default on these
bonds. Thus, if taken literally, this subsection solves the problem of trying to draw an inference about
Iraq's future prospects from the many variables analyzed above and the numerous ones that are not
amenable to this paper's methodological approach.
,
.
Background. Before analyzing these time series, it is informative to know the history of the Iraqi
bonds, some details on how bonds are priced on secondary bond markets, and why it is reasonable to
assume that world financial markets can efficiently aggregate the available information on Iraq's future.
Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq issued about $130 billion in debt. After the Gulf war, the
country defaulted on this debt. When the US led coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, the holders of this debt
were spread around the world. The Paris Club held claims of approximately S40 billion; Persian Gulf
"
I also considered using data from the Iraqi Stock Exchange but decided that this market was a local one with poor
liquidity and that it would be difficult to interpret any results. For example, the market only meets twice a week and
trading appears to be very thin. As evidence of this the total dollar value of all trading in February 2007 was less
than $5 million and only 45 of the 94 had any shares traded. Further, I was able to obtain data on a time series for
an index but 1 was unable to determine how the index was constructed, which companies were included, and
whether it was ever reconstituted. Finally, in principle, it is possible that shareholders wouldn't be damaged by a
failure of the Iraqi government (in contrast, a failure of the Iraqi govermnent would almost certainly lead to a defauh
on the Iraqi bonds).
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creditors had another $65 billion; and the remainder was in the hands of commercial creditors (Chaney
2007).
After the end of combat operations in May 2003, the US government brokered a deal to exchange
$1000 in the existing bonds for $200 worth of new bonds for those creditors who held at least $35 million
in Iraqi bonds so that the new Iraqi govenmient would not be hamstrung by this debt. As a result of this
debt relief agreement, the Iraqi government issued roughly $2.66 billion in US dollar denominated notes
in January 2006. These new bonds pay fixed coupons of 2.9% twice a year and have a maturity of
January 15, 2028.
Once these bonds were issued, they entered the world financial markets. All indications are that
there is a liquid and competitive market for them. For example, they began to trade on world financial
markets on January 20, 2006, and their prices and yields are reported in Bloomberg's financial services
database. A trader at JP Morgan said that
As much as 90% may have gone from the original holders (banks, trading companies,
engineering firms etc., i.e., not investment fiinds) to investment fijnds. And of that [the
bond are] are about evenly split between hedge funds and "real money" accounts
(maybe slightly more in "real money "). [Quoted in Chaney (2007), page 4]
Further there has been substantial trading of these bonds; about $4.1 billion of these bonds were traded in
the first quarter of 2006, when they were issued, and roughly $1.6 billion in the second quarter (Chaney
2007). Finally, the average bid-ask spread as a percentage of the average of the bid and the ask price has
been just 0.6% over the course of the bonds' trading history.
Why would the world financial market's assessment of the value of these bonds be informative
about the Surge's impact on Iraq's prospects? The reason is that owning a bond entitles the holder to a
stream of payments. In the case of the Iraqi bond, each $100 efface value of these bonds entitles holders
to receive $2.90 on the 15"' of every January and July through January 15, 2028 plus an additional $100
on January 15, 2028.
In a liquid market, the current value or price of a bond's stream of payments depends on the
perceived default risk and the yield curve. The former captures the probability that a bond's issuer will
stop making the scheduled payments before the maturity date. An increase in the probability of default
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would reduce a bond's value, because the bondholder's expected payments will have declined. The latter
measures the riskless interest rate (e.g., US Treasury bills) at each of the time intervals between the
present and the scheduled payments. Here, an increase in the yield curve would reduce the bond's value
because the future payments would be more heavily discounted and therefore less valuable today. '*
Secondary bond markets aggregate the available information on the probability of default and
future values of the yield curve to determine the value of bonds (or their scheduled set of payments).
Since the initiation of trading, the price of a $100 face value Iraqi bond has ranged between $56.18 and
$73.98. The lower prices reflect periods where the market's perception of the probability of default was
higher or the yield curve was higher. Thus, the secondary bond market provides a venue for market
participants to reach an agreement on the expected probability of defauh and the yield curve.
Prices and Yields ofIraqi Bonds. With this background, I now turn to a comparison of how the
difference or spread between the yields of the Iraqi state bonds and three alternative bonds changed after
the Surge began. Each of the alternative bonds is intended to serve as a control to avoid confounding the
impact of the Surge with other drivers of defauh risk or shifts in the yield curve. The first alternative is a
Qatari bond due in 2030 with a 9.6% coupon rate. The appeal of this as an alternative is that, like Iraq,
Qatar's economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues, so, in addition to having a similar maturity date,
this will at least partially adjust for changes in the probability of default due to changes in oil prices.
The second alternative bond is the Lehman Emerging Market Bond Index Yields, which adjusts
for changes in yields due to macroeconomic factors that affect default risk of developing countries
generally. The maturity date for this index was 2020 on August 27, 2007, so it isn't a perfect match on at
least one dimension. The Qatari bond and Lehman Index are also appealing, because the Surge period
partially coincides with the subprime mortgage lending crisis that caused a "flight to quality" for US
treasuries.




The third alternative bond is the US Inflation Indexed Treasury Bond due in 2028. This bond has
a nearly identical maturity date to the Iraqi bond and is used as an alternative to avoid confounding the
impact of the Surge with changes in the yield curve.
Figure 10 graphs these three spreads daily where days are again normalized so that day zero is
February 14, 2007. The spread between the Iraqi bond and the US bond is shown on the right axis of
Figure 10, since its yield is substantially lower than the others.
One key difference between bond prices (or yields) and the other outcome variables is that
efficient markets theory implies that it is not necessary to control for pre-existing trends in prices. This is
because financial markets are forward looking and all relevant information is reflected in the asset's price
at every point in time. Thus, this theory implies that pre-existing trends in prices do not predict future
prices. Further, the current prices reflect any future events that affect prices and are predictable.
Since financial markets are forward looking, there is no perfect start date for the analysis.
President Bush announced the Surge on January 10, 2007, but the Surge's activities didn't begin until
February 14, 2007. Further, there is some evidence that the military had begun planning for the Surge in
late December, and it is possible that bond traders were aware of this plarming. To account for all of
these potential start dates, the graph begins with t = -50. It is apparent that the choice of start date isn't
important because there is little variation in the spreads during this 50 day period.'^ For consistency with
the rest of the paper, I will emphasize results that compare spreads at t = (which is where the vertical
line is drawn) to the last available yields in our data file at t =191 (August 24, 2007).
The figure reveals that the spread between the Iraqi bond and all three alternatives grew
substantially in the period after the Surge. It increased by 153 basis points when the Qatari bond is the
alternative and 114 and 170 basis points when the comparisons are the Lehman index and US bond,
respectively. Interestingly, the increase in spread is almost entirely driven by an increase in the yields of
" There is a decline in spreads of about 20 basis points between t = -50 (December 26, 2006) and t = -35 (January
12, 2007) where the latter is two day's after President Bush's speech announcing the Surge. It may be appropriate to
attribute this decline to the Surge. However, even if this is the case, it is swamped by the increase in spreads that
occur after the Surge is initiated; so attributing this to the Surge would not affect the qualitative results.
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the Iraq bonds, which increased by 1 74 basis points in this period, rather than changes in the yields of the
alternatives."" Notably, these are easily the largest spreads since the Iraqi bonds began trading.
The increase in the spreads appears to be due to genuine increases in the market's expectation of
a default (and not due to changes in oil prices, the supply of capital to developing countries or changes in
the yield curve). With a few assumptions, it is possible to back out an estimate of the change in the
market's expected default rate. If we assume that the market for these bonds is perfectly competitive and
that the expected default rate is constant across periods"', then following Ma et. al (1989) we derive the
following relation: <
\^ (1+0* J (1+0" y^c^ +'")') (!+'•)"
Here, n is the number of periods (i.e. coupons),/? is the probability of not defaulting in each period, C is
the coupon rate as a percentage of the face value, / is the risk-free interest rate, r is the yield of the risky
asset, and g is the proportion of the face value plus the coupon recovered in the case of a default. The
left-hand side is the expected present discounted value of a dollar's worth of risky asset held to maturity.
The right-hand side is the certainty equivalent of the payoffs of the risky asset, discounted by the risky
asset's yield. Under perfect competition, these must be equal.
The software Mathematica is used to solve this equation for p, given different observations of n,
i, and /- for each day.^" The yield series of the Iraqi bond is used for r and the yield of the 20-year
^° An alternative approach to inferring the role is to conduct a cash flow analysis of the value of the Iraqi bond with
the t = and t = 191 yield curves. This exercise demonstrates that changes in the yield curve have little impact on
the value of the Iraqi bond in this period. This finding is not surprising in light of the flat and roughly constant yield
curve over this period.
"' This method for inferring the expected default risk requires the assumption that the probability of default is
constant in each period. This assumption is likely to cause the numbers in Figure 1 1 to understate the expected
default rate in the next few years (because if the Iraqi government survives until 2027, then the probability of
surviving until 2028 is surely higher than the probability that Iraq survives from today until one year from now,
given what we know today). Thus, the probability of default approximated using this fonnula is likely to be an
underestimate of the probability that Iraq survives from today to one year from today or other periods closer to the
present.
"' There are a variety of ways to account for the fact that each day that passes reduces the number of days until the
next coupon, and thus increases the probability that the next coupon will be redeemed (as well as reduces the
amount by which we should be discounting the coupon). For example, in the above formula, / can be replaced by
(d-124.5)/182.5, where d is the number of days until the bond's due date and 182.5 is half of a year. Such a
substitution is computationally unfavorable. I created similar series by rounding the expression (d-J 82.5)/]82.5 and
substituting it for t in the numerator or both the numerator and denominator. One problem that arises is that when
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Treasury bond is used for i. The bond pays coupons every 6 months at a rate of 2.9%. After the invasion
of Iraq, the Paris Club decided to reduce Iraq's sovereign debt by 80%. Assuming that a similar deal will
be offered to future governments of Iraq should the current one fail, we use a recovery rate ofg = 0.2.
Figure 1 1 plots the annual probability of default, which is 1-p' (because there are two coupon
payments per year), against the date relative to the Surge's initiation. The results are striking. The annual
probability of a default ranges between 5.65% and 6.10% in the days before the Surge and is 5.75% at t =
0. After the Surge begins, it is never this low again implying that even in the early days of the Surge the
market didn't believed that it would improve Iraq's future prospects. Perhaps even more notable, the
expected annual default probability rises to 8.14% by the end of the period. This is an approximately
40% increase in the expected default rate. The clear conclusion is that the world financial markets believe
that the probability that Iraq will default on its bond increased after the Surge's initiation.
Credit Default Swap Premiums for Iraqi Bonds. To supplement these results, I now turn to data
from a relatively new financial instrument, credit default swaps. These instruments provide a direct
measure of the market's expected default risk and therefore mitigate concerns about confounding change
in default risk and the yield curve in the above analysis. In a credit default swap, the purchaser pays the
seller a fixed premium each period until either defauh occurs or the swap contract matures. In exchange,
the seller is obligated to buy back from the buyer the defaulted bond at its par value if the issuer defaults
on its obligation. In essence, these credit default swaps are insurance against default for buyers that are
provided by sellers.
To further explore the impact of the surge on default risk, I collected data on prices (i.e.
premiums) for 5-year credit default swaps for the Iraqi bond and the CDX Emerging Market Diversified
Series, which is an index of 5 -year credit default swaps for an index of bonds from emerging markets."
About 75% of the constituent credit default swaps are sold on government issued debt and the remainder
such a substitution is made, the equation has multiple solutions for p that are real and between and 1 (one solution
is implausible, the other is very close to what we get making no substitution). In light of this finding, I decided not
to make any adjustment for the number of days to the next coupon (of course, I adjust for the number of coupons
remaining). However, none of the adjustments change the basic message of the graph.
"^ The index is reconstituted every 6 months, which can cause relatively minor jumps as bonds are added and
subtracted at the reconstitution dates. I focus on 5-year CDS prices because a private conversation with a Lehman
Brothers trader indicated that these are the most liquid CDS products.
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are from private companies located in emerging countries. The index is constructed by CDS Index CO
LLC, a consortium of 16 investment banks, and Markit Group Limited, a provider of independent data."'*
The indices are priced in basis points per year, so a price of 100 basis points implies that insurance against
default for 1 year costs 1% of the face value of the bond.
The full line in Figure 12 plots the spread in the prices between the Iraqi CDS and the Emerging
Market CDS index. It is apparent that the spread is substantial. For example, the price of a CDS for Iraq
varied between 514 and 530, while the index's varied between 73 and 88 basis points between t = -50 and
t = 0. This underscores that the expected default rate of the Iraqi bonds was very high, even by emerging
market standards.
The high price of the Iraqi CDS poses a challenge for determining the impact of the surge,
especially in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis that unfolded over part of this period and raised
the expected default rate of all risky bonds. I was unable to identify individual sovereign bonds with CDS
prices similar to the Iraqi CDS price prior to the Surge. Further, some of the higher priced ones (e.g.,
Venezuela) had idiosyncratic shocks to default risk in this period.'^ Thus, I believe the most defensible
strategy is to use the Emerging Market index (which includes Venezuela) as a counterfactual for Iraqi
CDS prices. It is evident, however, that the perfect counterfactual for Iraq is unavailable.
Returning to Figure 12, there is a dramatic increase in the spread after the Surge began.
Specifically, it increases from 436 basis points on February 14, 2007 to 676 basis points on August 24,
2007. Further, the spread never falls below the level at the initiation of the Surge. The similarity between
the evolution of the spread and the implied annual defauh rate in Figure 1 1 is striking."^
'* Both time series came from Markit which aggregates data from over 85 dealing firms. Markit's data on GDP
prices are the most reliable available, because they collect trading data from several investment banks and then clean
the data to create this time-series.
'^ Venezuela instituted legislation aimed at nationalizing large sectors of the oil sector in this period. This has led to
a dispute with Exxon and Conoco Phillips, which have refused to agree to Venezuela's terms. The outcome of this
dispute is currently unknown but expensive litigation- in international courts and the seizing of Venezuelan owned
refineries in the US are possible outcomes. The bond market has interpreted these events negatively and the price of
CDS for Venezuelan bonds has increased dramatically.
"*
It is possible to infer the expected default probabilities from the CDS premiums for the Iraqi state bonds with a
few assumptions (e.g., the recovery rate upon a default) (O'Kane and Tumbull 2003). These calculations indicate
that the expected defauh rate increased by about 50% from 6.68% on February 14, 2007 to 10.13% on August 24,
1997. This increase is similar in magnitude to the estimated 40% increase in the expected default rate from the
yields on the Iraqi bond yields. It is noteworthy that during this same period the expected default rates for Qatar and
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What factors determine the financial market's expected probabihty of default for the Iraqi bonds?
The defauh risk is a function of at least two factors. The first is the current and projected future stability
in Iraq. The second is the continued presence of the US military, which is likely a function of current and
projected stability in Iraq and domestic US politics. If the movements in default risk in Figures 1 1 and 12
are due to domestic US politics, which are unrelated to the current and projected stability in Iraq, then this
exercise cannot be used to judge the Surge.
With this issue in mind, it is important to highlight that a substantial portion of the increase in the
spreads occurs around t = 150, which is July 14, 2007. Two big events occurred right around then. First,
the Administration released their "Initial Benchmark Assessment Report" on July 1 2*. This failed to find
that the Surge had led to substantial progress toward meeting many of the 1 8 congressionally mandated
benchmarks for progress in Iraq. This event provided new information on the current functioning of the
Iraqi state. While it may have strengthened the case for withdrawing US troops from Iraq, it is evident
that the causal factor here was the new information, not a shift in domestic politics.
Second, the Senate Democrats tried to force a vote on a resolution that would have withdrawn
troops from Iraq. Supporters of the resolution failed to overcome the filibuster, but the cloture motion did
receive 52 votes (on July 18*), enough to pass the resolution if it had come to a vote. The outcome of this
vote is a political event. However, it is unclear whether the outcome of a vote that was almost entirely
decided along party lines and did not alter policy surprised the market. Even if it did, it is unclear whether
the market concluded that the US would stay for a shorter or longer period of time so the impact on
default risk seems unclear.
Figure 12 provides a more quantitative way to assess whether internal US politics caused the
increase in the implied annual default risk of Iraqi bonds. This graph is derived from a regression of the
CDS spread against a constant and the price of a prediction market contract that pays $100 if a Democrat
is elected president in 2008.'' The estimated coefficient on the contract price is 15.9 and would easily be
Egypt increased from 0.23% to 0.26% and 0.98% to 1.04%, respectively. These two comparisons were the ones
provided to me. However, they may not form the best counterfactual for Iraq.
"' The contract is offered through https://www.intrade.com/v2/ which is a marketplace for numerous prediction
markets. These prediction markets have an impressive track record of aggregating disperse information into
efficient forecasts about future events (Surowiecki 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewizt 2004).
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judged to be statistically different from zero by conventional criteria (t-statistic of 3), so the spread is
positively associated with this variable."** The dashed line plots the predicted default rate and the
difference between the full line and dashed line is the estimated residual. This difference is the
component of the spread that cannot be explained by the contract price.
Since Democrats in general and the leading Democratic presidential candidates in particular are
aggressively calling for leaving Iraq, it seems reasonable to assume that the prediction market contract is
a proxy for the probability that the US will substantially reduce its military presence in Iraq. For the
purpose of this analysis, I make the conservative assumption that movements in this variable are entirely
due to changes in US domestic issues."'
The striking finding is that the actual CDS spread increased dramatically but the predicted spread
was essentially flat. Put another way, the increase in the CDS spread in this period is largely unrelated to
changes in expectations about the 2008 Presidential election. For example, the increase in the residual
from t = to t = 191 accounts for about 88% of the increase in the expected default rate.^° This result
does not eliminate the possibility that the increase in the expected default risk is due to changes in
domestic US politics, but it substantially weakens the case for this explanation.^'
It is worth considering how the Surge could worsen expectations about Iraq's future even though
I cannot test the different possibilities. One possibility is that the Surge hardened the positions of the
combatants in Iraq (e.g., the US military's new alliances with the Sunnis may deepen Shi'a's resentments)
" Over the relevant sample, t =-50 through t = 191, the value of the contract ranges from $53.0 to $59. 0. Its value
on t = was $56.3 and it was $58.0 on t = 191.
^' In practice, this assumption implies that the possibility that the public's assessment of the degree of stability in
Iraq affects the probability that a Democrat will be elected President in 2008. This assumption is almost certainly
incorrect, because some of the support for Democrat Presidential candidates seems based on dissatisfaction with the
War in Iraq. However, it allows me to stack the deck in favor of the hypothesis that domestic political factors are
the source of movements in the expected default rate.
^^ This result is nearly identical with alternative models (e.g., estimating the parameters with data from the period
before the Surge only, including the current price of the contract and three lags, and modeling the contract price with
a cubic polynomial). If t = -50 is used as the starting date, then the increase in the residual accounts for about 66%
of the increase in the spread.
''
I also investigated using data on contracts that Democrats will hold a majority in the Senate and House in 2008.
These contracts are thinly traded during this period. For example, there were a number of periods lasting several
days with zero trades. Overall, mean daily volume for the senate and house contracts are 2.4 and 0.3 contracts,
respectively, compared to 68.4 for the presidential contracts. The point is that the thinness of these markets




and that this has lowered the prospects for a stable Iraq. Another is that the improvements in the security
situation have not been followed by meaningful political gains. Thus, the Surge may have revealed that
the depth of the political problem in Iraq is greater than previously was recognized. Further, the
revelation of the magnitude of this problem may have increased the probability that Congress or a new
President will remove US troops sooner than was expected.
The first of these possibilities is consistent with the Surge directly undermining the prospects for
a stable Iraq, while the other suggests that the Surge allowed for a clearer picture about the future.
Regardless of which explanation is correct, the most noteworthy finding from this analysis is that after the
Surge the spread between the prices for CDS for the Iraqi bonds and the emerging markets index never
declined. The same is true for the implied annual probability of default in Figure 1 1 . Thus to date, world
financial markets have never believed that the Surge will increase the prospects for a stable Iraq and may
in fact be undermining them.
Before proceeding to the conclusion, it is important to make clear a link that has been unstated
thus far. This subsection's analysis implicitly equates a default on the Iraqi bonds with a failure of the
Surge to achieve its goals. Indeed, governments have defaulted on sovereign debt before without
complete state failure. However, the political and security situation in Iraq and its neighborhood is
extraordinary. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the Iraqi government defaults on its bonds
even as a stable political and security environment is achieved.^"
VI. Conclusions
There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military "Surge" on conditions in Iraq
and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound.
Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important,
but until now few if any systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper
^' A so called "soft" or "hard" partition of the current Iraq doesn't imply a default. Such a scenario could well
include an oil revenue sharing agreement that would commit to servicing the debt.
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applies modem statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most
reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge's impact on three key dimensions.
The analysis reveals mixed evidence on the Surge's effect on key trends in Iraq. The security
situation has improved insofar as civilian fatalities have declined without any concurrent increase in
casualties among coalition and Iraqi troops. However, other areas, such as oil production and the number
of trained Iraqi Security Forces have shown no improvement or declined. Making sound decisions about
how to proceed in Iraq based on such conflicting indicators is challenging and uncertain. Moreover, this
uncertainty may allow analyst judgment and politics to play too large a role.
There is, however, another way to assess the Surge. This paper has shown how data from world
financial markets can be used to shed light on the central question of whether the Surge has increased or
diminished the prospect of a functioning Iraq. An appeal of using financial markets is that traders' only
concern is to make profitable decisions and this necessarily requires making correct projections. There
isn't room for personal biases in this setting and it therefore isn't surprising that financial markets have a
good track record of predicting future events.
I examine the price of Iraqi state bonds, which the Iraqi government is currently servicing, on
world financial markets. After the Surge, there is a sharp decline in the price of the Iraqi bonds, relative
to alternative bonds. This decline signaled an increase of approximately 40% in the market's expected
annual probability of default. This finding suggests that, to date, the Surge is failing to pave the way
toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it. In many respects, it is consistent with recent
assessments that fail to find that the Surge has led to substantial progress in meeting many of the 1
8
congressionally mandated benchmarks for progress in Iraq (GAO 2007).^^
This paper has produced a series of new facts on the Surge's impact. It is straightforward to
update these facts as new data becomes available. Further, the new facts can be used to aid decision
making about the future of the Surge.
^^ Most of these benchmarks are measures of political progress. Notably, Chaney (2007) found that political
progress in Iraq is associated with increases in the price of the Iraqi bonds in the January - August 2006 period. The
point is that world financial markets appear to believe that political progress is crucial for a stable Iraq to emerge.
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More broadly, the paper shows that even in unconventional wars, it is feasible to measure and
analyze important outcomes to learn about the war's success. Finally like Chaney (2007), it highlights
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This data appendix provides information on the data sources for this paper. It includes separate
subsections on each of the outcome variables analyzed.
I. Iraqi Security Forces Troop Strength
Weekly data on the size and makeup of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) comes from the Department of
State's Iraq Weekly Status Report (IWSR). This report provides updates on the progress toward eight
"pillars" of the US policy in Iraq. The weekly reports were downloaded from
http://www.state.gOv/p/nea/rIs/i-pt/iraqstatus/ .
Each report contains a slide entitled "[2.] Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance - Iraqi Security
Forces". The slide contains a chart that shows the number of persons trained and equipped in each
division of the ISF. At the bottom of the slide, an "as of date is given (e.g. "Data as of February 5,
2007"). This date is recorded in the variable isf_date. The number of days that this date is later than
February 14, 2007 is given in elec_count.
Three parts constitute the Ministry of the Interior's forces: Police, National Police, and Other Ministry of
the Interior Forces. These are recorded in the variables police, nat_police, and other_moi, respectively.
Before July 7, 2006, National Police and Other Ministry of the Interior Forces were combined in Other
Ministry of the Interior Forces observations. Three parts constitute the Ministry of Defense's forces:
Army, Air Force, and Navy. These are recorded in the variables army, navy, and air_force, respectively.
An important characteristic of the data is that the Ministry of the Interior numbers do include
unauthorized absence personnel, whereas the Ministry of Defense numbers do not include unauthorized
absence personnel. Thus, the Mol numbers are inflated above the actual strength of the force because
they include force members who have been equipped and trained but have left the force without
permission.
These numbers do not include what the IWSR estimates as 144,000 facilities protection services
personnel working in 27 ministries. Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support
Forces.
The IWSR lists its source as "DoD Iraq Weekly Status Report" or "DoD Input to Iraq Weekly Status
Report".
Observations that are exact duplicates (including isf_date) were discarded. What follows is a list of other
observations that have changed dates or been eliminated and the reasons:
— there were two observations for 12/28/2005, kept the one that was not identical to the
observation for 1 2/7/2005 (presumably, they forgot to update the numbers and the second
observation was reported more recently)
~ replaced the first observation for 7/7/2006 with the second because the second had
more detail as to how Mol forces were broken down and was otherwise identical (and
was reported more recently)




~ moved the second observation for 9/18/2006 to the week of 9/20/2006 and discarded
the first observation
~ removed the observation for 2/20/2007 because it was identical to that for 2/19/2007
and they were in the same week
~ there were two observations for 3/5/2007, kept the one that was not identical to the
observation for 2/20/2005 and 2/19/2005 (presumably, they forgot to update the numbers
and the second observation was reported more recently)
~ all dates 6/13/2007 and beyond are extrapolated (one week behind the date of the
report)
~ moved the observation for 6/19/2006 to the week of 6/21/2006 and the observation for
6/26/2006 to the week of 6/28/2006
II. Oil production
Weekly oil production data comes directly from the Department of State's Iraq Weekly Status Report
(IWSR), which provides updates on the progress toward eight "pillars" of the US policy in Iraq. The
weekly reports were downloaded from http://www.state.gOv/p/nea/rls/ipt/iraqstatus/ .
Each report contains a slide entitled "[5.] Help Iraq Strengthen Its Economy - Crude Oil Production".
The slide contains a chart with an entry for each of the last nine weeks and the current week. Each entry
is the weekly average of millions of barrels per day of crude oil produced. The current week's entry is
also reproduced beneath the chart.
When there was a conflict between the text and the chart, the number given on the chart was used. There
were two instances of this: the observation for 9/10/06 should be 2.37 (from chart in weekly report), but it
is given as 2.47 in the actual weekly report, the observation for 7/22/07 should be 2.10, but it is given as
2.06 in the actual weekly report.
The IWSR lists its source as "Department of State, NEA-1-ECON, 202-647-9885".
III. Electricity availability
Electricity availability data comes directly from the Department of State's Iraq Weekly Status Report
(IWSR), which provides updates on the progress toward eight "pillars" of the US policy in Iraq. The
weekly reports were downloaded from http://www.state.gOv/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/ .
Each report contains a slide entitled "[4.] Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential
Services - Electricity Overview". This slide contains a line graph of the daily load served and estimated
demanded in megawatt-hours (MWh). It also contains several bullet points that provide additional
figures. One such figure is the average of available hours of electricity in Baghdad and nationwide over
the past week (exact dates for which are given.)
The IWSR gives as its source a point-of-contact consisting of a name and a phone number. The point-of-
contact changes from time to time; in 2007 it read "POC Bob Means (202) 647-9815". The IWSR
stopped reporting this number after May 7, 2007, though the slide and graph are still present. It was
resumed on July 3 1 , 2007 with a caveat "Average hours of power via electricity grid after meeting
demand for essential services."
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IV. Weekly United States Forces Wounded
The US wounded data were downloaded from http://icasualties.org/oif/woundedByWeek.aspx. From the
icasualties.org website:
The Department of Defense does not release the names of the wounded, nor do they
provide details on how and when soldiers are wounded. Therefore, we are not able to
provide a list for each and every wounded soldier.
The DoD does provide a weekly summary, stating updated totalsfor the number wounded
and returned to action within 72 hours and the number wounded not returned to action.
We arrive at a weekly total by subtracting the new total from the previous weeks. This
methodology is not precise because it does not accountfor possible restatements of total
from previous week.
The Department of Defense also maintains a separate list detailing the number of
wounded by month and ser-vice branch. We transfer these totals to our database each
month and provide the same data in htmlformat. There are some inconsistencies in this
reporting - numbers in this chart boimce back and forth from one month to the next.
While compiling items for our news section, we often find articles about wounded
servicemen and we have provided an archive of these articles. Within this list you may
find multiple mentions of the same person, as well as references to soldiers who have
since succumbed to their wounds.
The number of wounded who were returned to duty within 72 hours and the number of wounded who
were unable to return with 72 hours are downloaded from the icasualties.org website. These two
variables are also summed to obtain the total wounded each week.
This "flow" data comes from differences in the stock variables reported by the Department of Defense on
a quasi-weekly basis. One problem with these series is that changes in these variables from week to week
may reflect soldiers who were wounded in the previous week and revisions in the number of wounded
soldiers from previous weeks. The latter is the variable of interest, while the former adds measurement
error. The measurement error is unlikely to serve as a source of bias, because it seems likely to have been
constant before and after the Surge.
V. Coalition Fatalities
Daily data on coalition deaths comes from iCasualties.org. We downloaded the data from
http://icasualties.org/oif/Details.aspx, which lists each death individually. We then aggregated the data by
day.
iCasualties follows a rigorous recording methodology. A US death is recorded when one of four events
occurs: (1) a news story or obituary that reports the death of a US service member is released (this must
also be confirmed by the DoD), (2) Centcom or the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF) releases the name
of a soldier who has died (Centcom releases must be confirmed by the DoD), (3) the DoD itself releases
the name of a soldier who has died, (4) the name of a soldier not already recorded appears in the weekly
updated Department of Records listing of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) fatalities.
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UK fatalities are recorded when the Ministry of Defense confirms that a soldier has died. For non-
American, non-British fatalities, the iCasualties website states:
Deaths for non English speaking countries prove to be the most difficult for gathering
information. Here we rely on our readers to point us in the right direction and try (often
in vain) to translate announcements into the bits of information we need for
documentation.
Complete documentation of iCasualties.org's methodology is available at
http://icasualties.org/oif/Methodologv.aspx .
VI. Yields for Inflation-Indexed Treasury Bond Due 2028
The series for us2028 was downloaded from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DTP30A28/downloaddata?cid=47 . The Fed denotes this series
as DTP30A28. It contains daily yields for the 30-Year 3-5/8% Treasury Inflation-Indexed Bond, due on
4/15/2028.
VII. United States Treasury Yield Curve
United States yield curve data comes from the U.S. Treasury's website. Nominal rates were downloaded
from http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/yield.shtmI .
The yield rates are constant maturity rates. This means that they are interpolated from an estimate of the
yield curve. According to the Treasury's website, "The Treasury yield curve is estimated daily using a
cubic spline model. Inputs to the model are primarily bid-side yields for on-the-run Treasury securities."
In this way, the Treasury provides yields for the following maturities: 1, 3 and 6 months and 1, 2, 3, 5, 7,
10, 20, and 30 years. Furthermore, we linearly interpolated rates that were not reported by the Treasury.
If the rate for a particular maturity was not reported, we created a line running through the nearest
maturities on either side of the missing maturity and read the rate off of this line. For example, if the 7-
year rate was given as 4% and the 10-year rate was given as 7%, then we assigned (2/3) * 4% + (1/3) *
7% = 5% to the 8-year rate and (2/3) * 4% + (1/3) * 7% = 6% to the 9-year rate.
VIII. Iraqi, Qatari, and Lehman Emerging Markets Index Bond Price and Yield Time Series Data
from Bloomberg Financial Data Service.
We downloaded daily prices and yields for an Iraqi state bond due in 2028 (annual coupon of 5.8%) and a
Qatari bond (annual coupon of 9.75%) due in 2030 from the Bloomberg financial data service. Both the
Iraqi and Qatari bonds are denominated in US dollars. The CUSIP for the Iraq bond is EF2306852 and it
is EC2682416 for the Qatar bond.
We also obtained a times series of prices and yields for the US Lehman Emerging Markets Bond Index
from Bloomberg. The Lehman Index includes fixed and floating-rate US dollar denominated debt fi-om
emerging markets. It had a maturity of March 5, 2020 as of August 27, 2007 when the data used in the
analysis was downloaded.
IX. Coalition Troop Levels
34

The monthly data for troop strength comes from the Brookings Iraq Index table titled "COALITION
TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 2003." The August 27, 2007, version of the Index was
accessed at http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf. The table was assembled by Brookings
from a variety of news sources (a list is available in the footnotes of the Iraq Index).
X. Civilian Fatalities from IraqBodyCount.org
Our primary source for data on civilian fatalities comes from the IraqBodyCount.org (IBC) website. The
principal researchers are Hamit Dardagan and John Sloboda. It is important to note upfront that the
website is partisan—that is, anti-war—but their methodology is conservative and seeks to provide an
accurate lower bound for the number of civilian deaths reported.
The data were downloaded from http://www.iraqbodvcount.org/database/ . Documentation of the IBC's
methodology is available at http://www.iraqbodvcount.0rg/background.php#methods and it is briefly
summarized here.
The database records each incident in which civilian deaths occurred separately. To create a daily time
series, we summed the deaths from incidents occurring on the same day. For some incidents, the date was
uncertain. In such cases we always chose the most recent possible date of the incident that was listed in
the website.
IBC collects news stories from a variety of trusted news sources with internet access. Currently, they use
38 such sources. A trusted news source is one widely cited or referenced by other sources, with a daily
updated website, full archives of stories, and fully public English-language access.
From each acceptable news story in which Iraqi civilians were reported as killed, IBC extracts the date,
time, and location of the incident, as well as the military target (as stated by military sources), the
weapon(s) used, and the number of civilian deaths (in two measures as described below). IBC records the
deaths from an incident if and only if there are at least two news sources that report the incident.
Once there are two news sources reporting an incident, two measures are constructed, reportedminimum
and reportedmaximiim. In reportedmaximiim, the highest number of civilian deaths from any of the
reporting sources is recorded. Unless a news source reports a lower number of deaths, the
reportedminimum is equal to reportedmaximiim. If multiple numbers are reported, the lowest is entered
as reportedminimum. This can be zero if "zero deaths" is reported. However, a wording like "unable to
confirm any civilian deaths" is not a report of zero deaths and thus is not entered in either column.
Moreover, when the report does not mention civilians specifically, this number is entered in the
reportedmaximum variable but zero is entered into the reportedminimum variable unless the proportion of
civilian deaths is given or a similar detail is given.) If a "family" is reported killed, this is entered as three
deaths.
IraqBodyCount.org also adds old incidents or hospital counts as much as 4 years old retroactively, which
raises two issues. First, in order to update the database, we must integrate old and new incidents. This is
done using the identifier provided by IBC. IBC does not specify that this identifier is unique, but a
computer-based check reveals that very few incidents with the same identifier have a different value for
the location field between the two data snapshots that we looked at. Those values that are different are
usually just reworded or more- or less-specific locations.
The second issue is that the fact that IBC adds old incidents retroactively may represent inaccuracies in
the more current data. Comparing data gathered on 7/9/2007 and 8/21/2007 yields the following results.
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The analysis is conducted with the mean of reportedminimum and reportedmaximiim. The mean of
reportedminimiim over the course of the entire database (which begins on March 21, 2003 ) is 41.6 deaths
per day, while the mean of reportedmaximum is 45.4 deaths per day. Thus, the differences are small and
average about 9% of the mean of reportedminimum and reportedmaximiim. Moreover, they are
equivalent on 59.6% of the days in the period from the first day of the database (January 1, 2003).
I coded a variable that differentiates between incidents in Baghdad and those not in Baghdad. This
variable was coded as 1 if the location field includes "Baghdad" (but not "near Baghdad" or "20 km north
of Baghdad") in its value and otherwise.
XI. Civilian Fatalities from Icasualties.org
The icasualites.org web site also publishes a database of civilian casualties. Their methodology for
counting fatalities appears less rigorous than the Iraq Body Count's methodology, so the paper's analysis
concentrates on the results using the IBC data.^"* Nevertheless, I estimated the mean shift and trend break
models with these data and this led to results that are qualitatively very similar to the results from the
IBC. These results are described in detail in the section of this paper that examines civilian casualties.
The icasualties data contains the following disclaimer:
The numbers compiled here are not definitive, but they do provide a good baselinefor
measuring daily reportedfatalities. No one should be surprised that monthly deaths tolls
from hospitals and morgues prove to be higher than what we have compiled - it should
be understood by all that the actual level ofviolence is higher than what the press is able
to report.
Complete documentation of iCasualties.org's methodology is available at
http://icasualties.org/oif/Methodologv.aspx
.
''' For example, the icasualties web site contains the following disclaimer: "For a detail list of Iraqi Deaths please see
The Iraqi Body Count."
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Table 1 : Summary Statistics About Iraq and the Surge
A. Key Statistics
Number of US Soldiers in Iraq, February 2007
Number of US Soldiers in Iraq, August 2007
Number of Iraqi Security Forces, February 14, 2007
Number of Iraqi Security Forces, August 8, 2007
Iraqi Bond Yield January 10, 2007
Iraqi Bond Yield February 14, 2007
Iraqi Bond Yield August 27, 2007
B. Means Calculated Over Alternative Time Periods
Mean Daily Iraqi Civilian Fatalities
(Baghdad only)
(Outside Baghdad Only)
Mean Number of Iraqi Security Forces
Mean Millions of Barrels per Day Crude Production
Average Hours of Electricity per Day in Baghdad
Average Hours of Electricity per Day in All of Iraq
Mean Daily Coalition Fatalities
Baghdad Only
Outside Baghdad Only
Mean Daily Wounded US Soldiers (serious wound)
Mean Daily Wounded US Soldiers (not serious wound)
Mean Iraqi Bond Yield
Standard Deviation of Iraqi Bond Yield
Mean of (Iraqi Yield - Qatari Yield)

























Notes: Panel A reports on the value of some of the subsequent dependent variables at some key dates. Panel B
calculates means of some of the variable over three time periods. In the "All" column, the sample begins with the
earliest observation and continues through the last available one. In the "1 .5 Years Prior" and "1 Year Prior"
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Table 4: Estimated Impact of Surge on Millions of Barrels per Day of Crude Oil Production Measured Weekly
(Based on Data through 25 Weeks After the Surge)








A. Mean Shift Model
l(Surge)
R-squared Statistic
B. Trend Break Model
Post-Trend
Evaluated at t = 25
Pre-Trend
R-squared Statistic 0.0465 0.0540
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.07 2.11
J^ 103 78
Notes: The entries report estimation results from the fitting of equations (1) and (2) for crude oil production
measured in millions of barrels per week (so t references a week). Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The Surge is defined to begin on February 14, 2007. These data are derived from the
Department of State's Iraq Weekly Status Report. Details on the data sources are reported in the Data Appendix.
*
significant at 1 -percent level, significant at 5-percent level.
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Table 5: Estimated Impact of Surge on Average Hours of Electricity per Day Available in Baghdad and All of Iraq
(Based on Data through 25 Weeks After the Surge)
Baghdad Only


















B. Trend Break Model
Post-Trend






















R-squared Statistic 0.1553 0.031 0.3650 0.254










Notes: The entries report estimation results from the fitting of equations (1) and (2) for hours of electricity per day in
Iraq measured weekly (so t references a week). Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The Surge is defined to begin on February 14, 2007. Note, these data are unavailable for the weeks t =
12 through t = 22. There are also a few other weeks missing. More details on the data are contained in the Data
Appendix.
**
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Figure 3: Daily Fatalities of Iraqi Civilians from 1 Year Before the Surge Began through 153 Days After the Surge
Began
-400 -200
Day Relative to Beginning of Surge (February 14)
200
Notes: The data points are the average daily fatalities per week in the period beginning one year before the initiation
of the Surge through 153 days after the Surge. The line is the fitted values from a regression of daily coalition
fatalities against a constant, a time trend, and the interaction of the time trend and an indicator variable equal to 1 for
days after February 14, 2007. See Table 2 and the text for fiirther details.
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Figure 4: Number of Iraqi Security Forces from 1 Year Before the Surge Began through 25 Weeks After the Surge
Began
-60 -40 -20
Week Relative to Beginning of Surge (February 14)
20
Notes: The data points are the number of Iraqi Security Forces measured weekly in the period beginning one year
before the initiation of the Surge through 1 86 days after the Surge. The line is the fitted values from a regression of
the number of Iraqi Security Forces against a constant, a time trend, and the interaction of the time trend and an
indicator variable equal to 1 for days after February 14, 2007. See Table 3 and the text for further details.
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Figure 5: Millions of Barrels of Oil Produced per Day (Measured Weekly) from 1 Year Before the Surge Began
through 25 Weeks After the Surge Began
-40 -20
Week Relative to Beginning of Surge (February 14)
20
Notes: The data points are the barrels (in millions) of oil produced per day (measured weekly) in the period
beginning one year before the initiation of the Surge through 1 86 days after the Surge. The line is the fitted values
from a regression of the barrels (in millions) of oil produced per day (measured weekly) against a constant, a time
trend, and the interaction of the time trend and an indicator variable equal to 1 for days after February 14, 2007. See
Table 4 and the text for further details.
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Figure 6: Hours per Day (Measured Weekly) of Electricity in Baghdad and All of Iraq from Year Before the Surge
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Figure 7: Daily Fatalities of Coalition Soldiers from 1 Year Before the Surge through 186 Days After the Surge
Began
-400 -200
Day Relative to Beginning of Surge (February 14)
200
Notes: The data points are the average daily fatalities of coalition soldiers per week in the period beginning one year
before the initiation of the Surge through 186 days after the Surge. The line is the fitted value from a regression of
daily coalition fatalities against a constant, a time trend, and the interaction of the time trend and an indicator
variable equal to 1 for days after February 14, 2007. See Table 6 and the text for further details.
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Figure 8: Daily Wounded US Soldiers from 1 Year Before the Surge through 182 Days After the Surge Began
-400 -200
Day Relative to Beginning of Surge (February 14)
200
Notes: The data points are the average daily non-fatal casualties per week in the period beginning one year before
the initiation of the Surge through 186 days after the Surge. The line is the fitted value from a regression of daily
coalition non-fatal casualties against a constant, a time trend, and the interaction of the time trend and an indicator
variable equal to 1 for days after February 14, 2007. See Table 7 and the text for fiirther details.
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Figure 9: Daily Fatalities of Iraqi Security Forces from 1 Year Before the Surge through 189 Days After the Surge
Began
-400 -200
Day Relative to Beginning of Surge (February 14)
200
Notes: The data points are the average daily fatalities per week in the period beginning one year before the initiation
of the Surge through 189 days after the Surge. The line is the fitted value from a regression of daily Iraqi security
force fatalities against a constant, a time trend, and the interaction of the time trend and an indicator variable equal
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Notes: This graph is derived from the yield series of the Iraqi bond due in 2028. The y-axis reports the implied
annual default rate of Iraqi state bonds. A value of .06 means that there is a 6% chance of a default per year. See
the text for technical details.
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Figure 12: The Role of Domestic US Politics on the Spread Between 5-Year Credit Default Swap Premiums for








Day Relative to Beginning of Surge (February 14)
200
CDS_Spread Fitted values
Notes: The full line plots the spread between the credit default swap premiums for the Iraqi bonds and an Index of
Emerging Market bonds. The dashed line reports the fitted value from a regression of the default probability against
a constant and the price of a contract that pays $100 if a Democrat is elected president in 2008. The contract prices
were downloaded from the web site https://www.intrade.com/v2/. Specifically, it is based on the contact with the
name "PRESIDENT.DEM2008" that is described as "Democratic Party Candidate to Win 2008 Presidential
Election". See the text for fiirther details.
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